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Evidence on Fiscal Consolidations and the Evolution of Public Debt in Europe 1 Introduction
In recent time, a wide debate has developed concerning the effects of restrictive fiscal policies on the dynamics of the ratio of public debt/GDP ratio (DGR). The debate is nourished by the current experience of EU countries, where fiscal consolidation policies are implemented with the objective of reducing their DGR. An objective which is now made mandatory by the new Six-pack and Fiscal Compact agreements which impose a precise reduction path for the countries exceeding the 60% Maastricht limit.
The object of this paper is the study of how the DGR dynamics changed when a fiscal consolidation was implemented. From an economic-policy perspective, building on past episodes, we aim to provide information helping to assess whether fiscal authorities' effort to contain the DGR through fiscal consolidations is effective or not in general terms. Indeed, the restrictive effect of a fiscal consolidation on the GDP might well offset the deficit reduction and cause an undesired DGR increase. As a matter of fact, this is a self-defeating outcome which one cannot exclude a-priori (Gros 2011 , Krugman 2011 , Southerland et al. 2012 ) and which has a clear theoretical reference in the fiscal multiplier literature (see, among the others, Cwik & Wieland 2011 for their focus on the Euro Area).
Our analysis covers a selected group of EU countries, observed over the period 1980-2009. We consider fiscal-consolidation events as recently recorded in Devries et al. (2011) and check (i) the associated contemporaneous variation in the DGR with respect to its past evolution, and (ii) the associated ex-post DGR cumulated change; results are drawn from the comparison of the DGR distribution under different policy stances. This work flows into a research stream devoted to the understanding of how fiscal policy affects macroeconomic variables (Alesina et al. 1995) and which explicitely considers differnent policy optionions in the presence of public debt (Corsetti et al. 2011) . It is also particularly relevant in the context of the actions taken to tackle the Euro Area debt crisis started in 2010 (Cafiso 2012) .
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces to the budget relations which are object of our empirical investigation. Section 3 describes the data set of fiscal-consolidation events used, which is the edge of our analysis. Section 4 outlines the analysis. In sections 5 and 6 we discuss respectively the short and medium-term results of the analysis. A discussion of whether the Euro's introduction has altered the association between fiscal consolidations and the dynamics of the debt/GDP ratio is in section 7. Section 8 provides the concluding remarks. 2 2 Budget relations: a simple algebra of deficit and debt dynamics
The budget relations at the basis of our empirical investigation can be easily derived from national budget accounting (Escolano 2010) . The way in which we present them in this section is inspired from Gros (2011) . We start with the difference equation which describes the debt evolution:
where t B is the debt level and t OD is the overall deficit, such that 
Using small letters for GDP ratios and re-expressing the equation in terms of first differences, we obtain:
(3)
At this point, we draw from the fiscal multiplier literature (e.g., Corsetti et al. 2011 ) and illustrate the possible effect of a deficit reduction on the DGR variation both in the short-term and over a longer period. The following discussion develops considering the DGR variation, not the DGR level. Indeed, as it will be made clear in section 4.3, we are interested in its average change in fiscal-consolidation years with respect to years of no fiscal-consolidation. 2 2.1 Short-term effect of a deficit reduction on the DGR Gros (2011) 
> means that a higher (lower) deficit will cause a higher (lower) debt variation.
Then, a lower deficit will not affect positively the same-year DGR when the opposite holds true, that is
Gros (2011) labels
as fiscal multiplier. He argues that if it is equal to +1, and furthermore
, condition (5) may happen to hold for a country with a DGR larger than one; for e.g. Italy, where the DGR is approximately 1.2. 3
Longer-term effect of a deficit reduction on the DGR
The longer-term effect of a deficit reduction is defined as the cumulated m-periods DGR variation caused by a year t deficit reduction; in symbols, Gros (2011) considers the longer-term effect of a deficit reduction in two alternative cases, namely under a temporary or definitive deficit reduction.
I) Temporary Deficit Reduction:
Here we can imagine further sub-cases: 1a) no output drop, 1
Case (1c) is unlikely to happen since the deficit reduction under scrutiny is temporary. As for case (1b), the longer-term effect (from t+1) is positive and limited to less debt-creation in t if and only if the output drop in t does not offset completely the deficit reduction. In case (1a) the maximum longer-term effect of a temporary deficit reduction emerges because less debt has been added through less deficit in t at a constant output level.
Also in this case, it is possible to consider some sub-cases: 2a) contemporaneous but temporary output drop,
; 2b) contemporaneous and prolonged output drop,
We imagine case (2c) not to be likely because the output tends to return to its growth path in the long-run, even in case of a permanent deficit reduction. In case (2d) the cumulative beneficial effect is to take forgiven, because less debt has been added through comparatively less deficit in each year at a constant GDP level. As for case (2a), a beneficial effect in terms of DGR evolution is assumed from t+1 onwards.
Case (2b) needs more consideration. We develop the discussion by considering a 2-year time horizon (m=2). Since we apply such 2-year horizon in our subsequent empirical investigation, we will talk of medium-term effect of a fiscal consolidation in the analysis in section 6.
If we imagine that the deficit reduction is such to keep down the GDP level for m=2, we need to evaluate the link:
By considering the conditions defining the case (2b), namely, 1
, equation (6) becomes: 7) or, equivalently, 8) and in terms of 2-year cumulated change:
In the manner of Gros (2011) , and taking into account that 1 t t od od + = under case (2b), the effect of a permanent deficit reduction may be expressed as the first derivative of eq. (9)
From equation (10), the condition for having a self-defeating outcome from a fiscal consolidation policy is:
Condition (11) is more difficult to meet than condition (5) because the product of the fiscal multiplier and the starting debt/GDP ratio must now exceed 2.
Before moving to the empirical analysis, we point out that there is no theoretical reason for which the short and longer-term effect of a fiscal consolidation on the DGR should be of the same sing. As recently explained by Clinton et al. (2011) , other factors may come into place and alter the overall outcome. To wit, the GDP variation is likely not to be constant between the short and medium term (Conen et al. 2008 ).
In the empirical analysis that follows, we study the short-term effect through a variable which quantifies the deviation of the DGR trend (section 5). Indeed, debt and deficit data do not allow studying the intra-
year effect, and we therefore compare the DGR variation contemporaneous to a fiscal adjustment with the variation registered in the two previous years. As for the so-called longer-term effect, we use the 2-year cumulated change (section 6) and therefore talk of medium-term effect.
A new data set of Fiscal Consolidation events
For the scope of our analysis we use the recent data set provided by Devries et al. (2011) : they compile a data set of the Budgetary Effect of Fiscal Consolidation measures (BEFC) following the so-called narrative approach first developed by Romer & Romer (2010) . The edge of this data set is that it records the BEFC using contemporaneous estimates in official government documents. The data set reports the BEFC only of deficit-reducing measures. Namely, it quantifies the deficit reduction in terms of GDP as an outcome of the fiscal authorities' discretionary action to reduce such deficit. Hence, there is no record if in a certain
year the deficit has decreased because of an output increase, or other events different from discretionary policy.
We consider observations for thirteen EU countries available in the data set, which are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, with a yearly frequency over the 1980-2009 time span.
The same data set of Devries et al. (2011) is used by Guajardo et al. (2011) to test the expansionary austerity hypothesis as documented in several contributions (Alesina & Ardagna 2010 , Giavazzi & Pagano 1990 ).
According to the expansionary austerity hypothesis, a fiscal consolidation causes a GDP increase under certain circumstances (for a detailed and clarifying discussion for the Euro Area countries when the goal is a DGR reduction, see Coenen et al. 2007) . With a specific reference to Alesina & Ardagna (2010) , the objective of Guajardo et al. (2011) is to prove that the expansionary austerity hypothesis emerges as a bias of using significant variation of the Cyclical-Adjusted Primary Balance to account for changes in the fiscal stance. They provide evidence that this is the case, by showing that fiscal consolidations cause real GDP contractions. Furthermore, they show that tax-increase-based fiscal consolidations are more negative on the GDP than expenditure-cuts-based ones, as already pointed out in several contributions (e.g., Perotti 1996) . The result by Guajardo et al. (2011) is relevant for our analysis because the negative effect of fiscal consolidations on the GDP affects the association between fiscal consolidations and the DGR, as discussed in section 2.
Outline of the Analysis
We have two research objectives. First, we aim to assess whether a discontinuity in the DGR evolution (with respect to its recent past) emerges at the time of a significant fiscal consolidation (short-term response). Second, we want to quantify the DGR cumulated change following a fiscal consolidation in order to assess if the DGR increases or diminishes and by which amount (medium-term response).
We start by describing the series used in the analysis (section 4.1) and through a first insight into the budget relations studied using pairwise correlations (section 4.2). Afterwards, we explain how we split the sample of countries into two groups, using cluster analysis, to have a finer investigation (4.3). in the case of yes-FC, the value of BEC is equal to the budget amount of the adjustment (in terms of GDP) as reported in the BEFC data set by Devries et al. (2011) . Formally:
The BEC and the DGR series
In case of yes-FC, the distribution of variable BEC is very heterogeneous among countries, as shown in The distribution of the variable describing the DGR variations ( DGR ∆ ) is reported in Table 1 under different conditions. In Panel A we report the distribution of the whole sample: it emerges that positive variations are more than the negative (50 th percentile is positive), and the bulk of values lies to the left of the mean (positive skewness). Then, DGR increases have been more frequent than decreases. Figure 1 in Appendix A provides the graphs of the historical DGR evolution in our sample.
In our analysis we compare the DGR ∆ distribution in different policy stances. If one considers years of yes-FC (panel C in Table 1 ) against years of no-FC (panel B in Table 1 ), it emerges that in periods of no-FC there are more negative variations (the DGR decreases), while there are more positive DGR ∆ in case of yes-FC. Furthermore, the larger the BEC (above 50 th percentile), the larger the portion of positive DGR ∆ (as it is clear from the comparison between panels D and E). 
Correlation Analysis and related considerations
In this section we explore correlations between some variables of interest in order to gain basic information useful for the following analysis. Moreover, drawing from the correlation values, we raise some issues which motivate the analytical approach taken. Pairwise correlations under different restrictions are in Table 2 (see panels A and C). The association therefore seems to last only 1-period ahead. Given this result, our subsequent analysis on the DGR evolution is limited to a 2-year horizon.
The contemporaneous correlation between BEC and rg is negative (panel C): the larger the fiscal consolidation, the smaller the real-GDP growth rate; a result coherent with the analysis in Guajardo et al. (2011) .The correlation between real-GDP growth and DGR ∆ is strongly negative too both in case of yesand no-FC: the smaller the GDP growth, the larger the government's financing needs. The negative correlation between BEC and real GDP growth raises a sample-selection bias issue: we consider FC events and DGR variations in years when real GDP growth is below its average. This emerges also by comparing the average real GDP growth rate in cases of no or yes-FC as reported in Table 2 (lower part) .
Lower GDP growth may be either the cause or the consequence of a fiscal consolidation (reverse causality issue): of course, deficit-reducing fiscal consolidations are likely during recessions, but a fiscal-tightening is also likely to cause lower demand and GDP as an outcome. 5 5 Likely, in more recent years and for the Euro Area countries under considerations, lower growth is the cause of deficit-reducing consolidations because of externally-imposed discipline such as the Stability and Growth pact (since 1999). However, further in the past, EU countries committed often to deficit-reducing measures for other reasons too. Just to provide an example here, in 1984 Belgium lunched a three year programme to reduce its deficit (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) . The 1984 IMF Recent Economic Developments reports that it was motivated by "the awareness that the borrowing requirement was approaching a self-perpetuating level through the 'snowball effect' on interest payments". For a detailed discussion of the background of each FC event included in our sample, see Devries et al. (2011) .
The issues of causality and selection bias discussed here, as well as obvious simultaneity between the BEC and ∆DGR series, are the motivation why we opt for non-econometric methods in developing our analysis. Indeed, we prefer an approach based on the comparison of distributions, an approach which we believe to be more reliable and robust to the mentioned issues.
Variables for the analysis and country grouping
In this section we introduce the two variables used respectively for the short-term analysis (section 5) and the medium-term analysis (section 6). We also explain the cluster analysis based on such variables and used to divide our sample into two groups for a comparison purpose.
A variable to capture the Break of Tendency
We introduce a variable denoted as DTbit which accounts for the deviation of the current DGR variation ( t b ∆ ) with respect to the average DGR variation in the previous two periods (t-1 and t-2); formally:
and t b is the debt/GDP ratio (DGR). Note that:
• DTbit >0 signals a favourable evolution in year t : the current increase in b is smaller than the average increase registered in the two previous years, or even, the country records a current DGR decrease larger with respect to the previous 2-year average;
• DTbit<0 signals an adverse evolution in year t : either the DGR increase is higher or its reduction smaller with respect to the previous 2-year average. 
Clearly, in every year t, DTbit* can be positive, negative or zero. We judge a fiscal consolidation favourable on the DGR short-term evolution, if we observe a positive DTbit* value (desiderd outcome).
A variable to measure the Cumulated Change
We study the medium-term response of a fiscal-consolidation on the DGR by considering the 2-year cumulated change:
and bt is the debt/GDP ratio (DGR). As already mentioned, we opt for a 2-year horizon because correlations in Table 2 signal a statistical significant effect up to the following year only. 6
As for DTbit, we focus on non-marginal cumulated changes, we therefore consider 2 1 it b + ∆ above the 25 th percentile of country i's absolute-value distribution:
In every year t,
can be positive, negative or non-significant (equal to zero). We judge a fiscal consolidation favourable on the DGR medium-term evolution if we observe an associated negative
Country grouping
We now consider the two variables explained above (DTbit and 2 1 it b + ∆ ) to split our country sample into two groups by using cluster analysis. We generate two groups to compare their short and medium-term response to a FC event. If a statistically-significant difference emerges between such groups, we will conclude that they behave differently (sections 5 and 6).
Cluster analysis attempts to determine the natural groupings (or clusters) of observations (Everitt et al. 2001 ). It breaks the observations into k distinct number of non-overlapping groups; in our application k=2. We implement the "means" partition method. 7 The cluster analysis is based on the DTbit and 2 1 it b + ∆ values only in yes-FC years because we want to cluster countries for their different response to a FC event.
The cluster analysis generates 2 clusters (A and B); we label as "cluster A" the one with the lower 2 1 it b + ∆ mean value (smaller 2-year cumulated change) and the higher DTbit mean value (larger positive break of 6 Other authors, like Alesina & Ardagna (2010) , choose a 3-year period instead. We tested our conclusions also using such horizon, and they remain largely unchanged. 7 In means-clustering, each observation is assigned to the group whose mean is closest, and then based on that categorization, new group means are determined. These steps continue until no observations change groups. The algorithm begins with k seed values, which act as the k group means. There are many ways to specify the beginning seed values. We specify that k partitions are formed randomly among the observations to be clustered, then the group means from the k groups defined by this partitioning are used as the starting group centres. As similarity measure we use the Euclidean distance. tendency). Since we have multiple time observations per country, it happens that some observations of a country fall in cluster A, while others in the cluster B. We denote as non-virtuous the countries for which the portion of "cluster A" observations is below the 25 th percentile of the all-countries distribution of "cluster A" portions. Based on this criterion, the non-virtuous group turns out to consist of Spain (ES), Ireland (IE) and Portugal (PT); all the other countries are in the virtuous group. Some details and the final result of the present cluster analysis are reported in Table 3 . 8 .67 V Note: The Table reports the number of fiscal consolidation episodes for each country, the number of observations falling in cluster A and the portion over the total. In the "final group" column, V stays for "virtuous" and NV for "non-virtuous", as explained in text.
Short-term analysis: Break of Tendency
In this section we develop the first part of our analysis, our aim is to check if a discontinuity in the DGR evolution emerges (present with respect to past) when a fiscal consolidation is enforced. We start by studying DTbit* for the whole sample of countries, then we compare DTbit* between the virtuous and non-virtuous group of countries.
All-countries analysis
In the whole sample (266 observations, both yes-FC and no-FC years), the share of positive values of DTbit* is 53.0% (id A in Table 5 ). Then, positive and negative deviations are almost equal in number. If we consider years of yes-FC against no-FC years, portions diverge: 64.8% positive in case of yes-FC (id C in Table 4 ), 47.2% positive in case of no-FC (id B in Table 4 ). We test whether such portions are statistically different from each other, through the Chi-squared Test (Conover, 1999) which checks association, and the Rank-sum Test (Wilcoxon 1945) which checks origin from the same distribution.
Both tests reject the null hypothesis (p.B=p.C, in Table 4 ) and signal that the distribution of positive DTbit* is statistically different under the two policy stances.
The same point is supported by binomial tests which indicate that the share of positive DTbit* in case of no-FC is statistically equal to half (p.B=0.5 in Table 4 ), while it is not in case of yes-FC (p.C=0.5 in Table   4 ). It is worth emphasising that the share of episodes with the desired outcome is 64.8%, largely far from 100% which is what one might like.
These results suggest that fiscal consolidations are associated with a larger portion of favourable outcomes than years in which no fiscal consolidations occur. This finding matches desired expectations concerning the effect of a fiscal consolidation intended to correct the debt evolution. In the following sub-section we test this finding for the virtuous/non-virtuous groups to check its robustness. Wilcoxon (1945) test which checks origin from the same distribution, the Binomial probability test (Stata 2009 ) checks the likelihood of a specified probability. H0: p.B=p.C means that the null hypothesis is the equality of portions in case B and in case C. The null hypothesis is rejected or not rejected at the 5% significance level.
Virtuous versus non-Virtuous countries
We now consider the portion of positive deviations for the group of virtuous against non-virtuous countries (Ireland, Portugal and Spain); results are in Table 5 . The portion of positive deviations (DTbit* >0) is similar between the two groups in case of no-FC (id B and E in Table 5 ); coherently, the tests do not reject H0, and their difference is not statistically-significant (p.B=p.E in Table 5 ). On the contrary, in case of yes-FC (id C and F in Table 5 ) the portion of positive deviations is 36.4% for non-virtuous countries and 74.2% for virtuous countries with both tests rejecting H0 at 10% (p.C=p.F in Table 5 ).
By-group results suggest that fiscal consolidations are largely associated to favourable outcomes, in terms of DGR evolution, only in virtuous countries. Differently, non-virtuous countries respond negatively. Figure 2 in Appendix A displays the break-of-tendency analysis in charts by country. Wilcoxon (1945) test which checks origin from the same distribution; H0 is rejected or not rejected at the 5% significance level.
Medium-term analysis: Cumulated Change
In the previous section we discussed the association between fiscal consolidations and the contemporaneous DGR evolution considered with respect to its past change (interpreted as the shortterm response to a fiscal consolidation). In this section we consider what is the 2-year cumulated DGR change after a fiscal consolidation. As Alesina & Ardagna (2010) , we judge a fiscal consolidation as favourable on the DGR evolution if we observe a negative 2-year cumulated DGR change (
is the desired outcome. We therefore consider portions of negative
over the total number of * 2 1 it b + ∆ .
All-countries analysis
When we consider the whole sample, the portion of negative
over the total number (266 obs) is 44.7% (id A in Table 6 ); negative 2-year cumulated changes are slightly less than positive ones. When we consider no-FC years against yes-FC years, portions diverge: the portion of negative
is 49.7% in case of no-FC and 32.4% in case of yes-FC (id B, C in Table 6 ) with their difference being statisticallysignificant both using the Chi-square and Rank-sum test (p.B=p.C in the second part of Table 6 ). Also in this case, the results are supported by binomial distribution tests. Furthermore, the portion of negative
decreases further with the size of fiscal consolidation (id D versus id C in Table 6 ).
These pieces of evidence are bad news as to the effectiveness of fiscal consolidations: the pooled analysis suggests that FC events are mainly associated to an adverse DGR evolution in the current and following
year. 9 Furthermore, the tighter the fiscal consolidation is, the less the portion of DGR decreases. Wilcoxon (1945) test which checks origin from the same distribution, the Binomial probability test (Stata 2009 ) checks the likelihood of a specified probability.H0 is rejected or not rejected at the 5% significance level.
Virtuous versus non-Virtuous countries
We now consider the portion of negative 2 1
for the group of virtuous and non-virtuous countries separately; descriptive statistics and relative tests are provided in Table 7 . We recall that the desired outcome of a fiscal consolidation on the cumulated DGR evolution corresponds to negative value of Table 7 ; note that null hypothesis p.A=p.D is not rejected): the share of desired outcomes is smaller than the half in both groups. If we limit our consideration to the no-FC years, the portion of negative values increases to 63.6% in non-virtuous countries and to 45.5% in virtuous countries (B versus E); tests provide contradictory evidence about the relevance of their difference (p.B=p.E in Table 7 ). This result is not a surprise since the clustering is done considering only yes-FC years. Indeed, portions across groups reverse in the case of yes-FC episodes: negative cases drops to 10.5% in non-virtuous countries and to 39.7% in virtuous countries (C versus F) with their difference being statistically significant ( p.C=p.F in Table 7 ). Wilcoxon (1945) test which checks origin from the same distribution; H0 is rejected or not rejected at the 5% significance level.
By-group analysis confirms results from the pooled sample: FC events are associated with a smaller portion of negative 2 1 it b * + ∆ in both groups, but the portion is much lower for non-virtuous countries. This means that in case of a FC both virtuous and non-virtuous countries' DGR evolution worsens. In Figure   3 of Appendix A we display the 2-year cumulated change ( 2 1 it b * + ∆ ) in charts by country.
Size of the cumulated change: tax-based versus expenditures-based consolidations
Some researchers argue that fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts are more effective in stabilizing the DGR than those based on a tax increase (e.g., Alesina & Ardagna 2010) . Their argument builds on the evidence that expenditure cuts appear less output-depressive than tax increases -as a matter of empirical evidence- (Gujarado et al. 2011) . The issue is also of interest because expenditure reductions are generally seen as a necessary policy option given the limit to an ever-higher taxation when the DGR is already high (Corsetti et al. 2011) . Moreover, the anticipation of a spending cut enhances the expansionary effect of a fiscal stimulus (Corsetti et al. 2010 In line with previous research, we may conclude that a significant difference emerges concerning the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation options on the DGR evolution: when fiscal consolidations work, those based on expenditure cuts seem more effective. 13 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analysed the effect of fiscal consolidation policies in a set of EU countries, over the period 1980-2009. In our investigation we have used the data set made available by Devries et al. (2011) , which is built following the so-called narrative approach. Such data represent a novelty, within a wide and lively body of literature on the effects of fiscal policy upon macroeconomic variables and public debt dynamics.
Our results can be summarised as follows. Fiscal consolidations appear to have a favourable contemporaneous effect on the debt/GDP ratio, when one considers the whole sample of EU countries under scrutiny. More precisely, fiscal consolidation policies appear to interrupt the growth tendency of the debt/GDP ratio in the larger part of cases. Nevertheless, by going deeper, we find that the favourable break of tendency pertains to a specific set of countries only (labelled as "virtuous countries"), while the break of tendency is generally adverse for some others ("non-virtuous" countries).
14 With respect to the analysis in the other sections, we therefore rule out Denmark, Sweden and the UK from the sample. To ease the reading, we have not reported the results discussed in this section. Nonetheless, they are promptly available upon request. 15 Not surprisingly, if we consider the whole sample regardless of fiscal consolidations (both yes-and no-FC years), the analysis shows that positive cumulated changes ( ) 2 1 t b + ∆ are more concentrated in the pre-Euro period, while negative cumulated changes are in the Euro period. We imagine that this is easily explained by the tighter budget behaviour required to each country once it has joined the Euro.
As far as the effects are concerned over a medium-term horizon (namely, the cumulative effect in the current and following year) they seem to be adverse (that is, self-defeating) in all countries. Indeed, fiscal consolidations are more likely associated to a 2-year cumulated DGR increase in general; this is especially true for non-virtuous countries. Furthermore, when fiscal consolidations work in reducing the DGR, the analysis shows that 2-year DGR decreases are larger on-average when fiscal consolidations are based more on expenditures-cut than on a tax-increase.
A difference between the short and medium-term response therefore emerges in our analysis: the former is favourable for the majority of countries (virtuous), while the latter is generally adverse for all countries.
A plausible explanation can be found in Guajardo et al. (2011) where the authors show that the FC effect on real GDP achieves its peak within two years. Then, the different timing of the FC effect on the deficit (in level) and on the output may explain the difference between the short and medium-term. To wit, the deficit responds contemporaneously and this causes a positive short-term effect given that the GDP remains temporarily stable, but when the GDP starts declining the DGR worsens and this explains the adverse medium-term response. This explanation is in line with other studies (among the others, Clinton et al. 2011), which highlight a varying effect of fiscal consolidations on macroeconomic variables over time.
This explanation, however, does not fit the experience of a small group of countries (namely, the countries that we have labelled as "non virtuous") which record an adverse response also in the short-term. We imagine that these countries have idiosyncratic characteristics which make them different from the others as signalled by the cluster analysis itself. However, we postpone a results-founded explanation to further research on this topic. Notes: •db1 is the DGR variation at time t, db1_y2 is the average DGR variation in t-1 and t-2, red "x" marks event of fiscal consolidations and their amount(BEC) •The vertical distance between the green bar and the red cross reflects the DTbit* amount in case of yes-FC.
